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THE STATUS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AT THE END OF THE
MILLENNIUM
Kurt T. Lash*
I have the privilege of introducing the 1998 Bums Lecture Sym-
posium-Religious Liberty in the Next Millennium: Should We
Amend the Religion Clauses of the United States Constitution? My
role in this Symposium is to acquaint you with the religion clauses of
the Constitution-where they came from-where they've been-and
where they seem to be today. Our Symposium contributors, Profes-
sors Kent Greenawalt and Robert George will discuss just where they
think the religion clauses should go in the future.
THE LAW
Let's start with the text. The first words of the First Amendment
declare that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' This disarm-
ingly brief phrase has been notoriously difficult to interpret-perhaps
due in part to the ambiguous historical origins of the text.
In 1791, when the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution,
there was a variety of popular views regarding the appropriate rela-
tionship between religion and the government. Separationists, like
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, believed that civil govern-
ment had no legitimate reason to interfere in religious matters. 2 Only
a few years before the adoption of the First Amendment, Madison
wrote his famous Memorial and Remonstrance in which he argued
against a proposed Virginia tax for the support of ministers and
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See James Madison, Virginia Ratifying Convention, in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 88, 88 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987) [hereinafter 5 FOUNDERS' CONST.]. Madison stated, "There is not a
shadow of right in the government to intermeddle with religion. Its least inter-
ference with it, would be a most flagrant usurpation." Id.
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churches.3 Not only was the proposed tax defeated, but the Virginia
legislature instead passed Thomas Jefferson's Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom.
4
The Supreme Court has long given a special place to the views
of Madison and Jefferson-and the so-called "Virginia Experi-
ence"--in its efforts to identify the original purposes behind the
adoption of the religion clauses.5 Clearly these two Founders be-
lieved that the First Amendment embraced a broad principle of sepa-
ration. In his "Detached Memoranda," Madison wrote that the Con-
stitution forbids "everything like" an establishment of religion.
6
Thomas Jefferson, in his letter to the Danbury Baptist Association,
wrote that the religion clauses built "a wall of separation between
church and state."
7
But, in 1791, not everyone agreed that church and state could-
or ought to-remain separated. Founders like George Washington
8
and early Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story,9 believed that gov-
ernment had a duty to promote and support the religious beliefs of
the people. In fact, the idea that religious belief was essential to good
government was quite common in 1791. State laws at the time con-
tained everything from religious qualifications for public office, to
tax assessments for churches and ministers, to criminal prosecutions
for religious blasphemy.' 0 Indeed, the same Congress that proposed
3. See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, in 5 FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 2, at 82.
4. See Thomas Jefferson, Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 5
FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 2, at 77.
5. For a discussion of the case law, see Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adop-
tion of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle,
27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1085, 1153 (1995).
6. See James Madison, Detached Memoranda, in 5 FOUNDERS' CONST.,
supra note 2, at 103.
7. THOMAs JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
8. See George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), in
WRITINGS 962, 971 (John Rhodehamel ed., 1997).
9. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 986 (Carolina Academic Press, 1987).
10. See, e.g., Spiller v. Wobum, 94 Mass. (11 Allen) 127, 129 (1866) (af-
firming the expulsion of a Catholic student for refusing to bow her head during
the morning Bible reading in compliance with state law that required the daily
reading of the Bible "without note or oral comment"); Sellers v. Duqan, 18
Ohio 489, 489 (1849) (holding void a contract on the ground that it was made
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the First Amendment also instituted the practice of opening legisla-
tive sessions with prayers, by a chaplain, paid at taxpayer expense."
Although separationists like Madison and Jefferson and quasi-
establishmentarians like Washington and Story disagreed about the
proper relationship between church and state, they did find common
ground on at least one matter: Regulatory power over subjects like
religion, speech and the press was to be left in the hands of the state
legislatures and not the federal government. 12  Thus, the First
Amendment expressly restricts Congress, not the state legislatures.
The Tenth Amendment, by implication, reserves power over the
subject of religion to the states. 13 In this way, the original First
Amendment embraced not so much the separation of church and
state, as the separation of federal and state responsibilities. The re-
ligion clauses, in other words, originally embraced the principle of
federalism.
This "federalism" principle, of course, presumably was erased
from the First Amendment in 1868 when we adopted the Fourteenth
Amendment. 14 That amendment prohibits any state from depriving
one's liberty without due process of law.15 In the 1940s, the
on a Sunday in violation of state law prohibiting "common labor on Sunday");
People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. 1811), reprinted in 5 FOUNDERS'
CONST., supra note 2, at 101 (asserting "to revile, with malicious and blas-
phemous contempt, the religion professed by almost the whole community, is
an abuse" of the right of "free, equal, and undisturbed, enjoyment of religious
opinion").
11. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 2180 (1789) (providing that "there shall be al-
lowed to each chaplain of Congress... five hundred dollars per annum during
the session of Congress"). For a general discussion on the history behind con-
gressional chaplains, see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-90 (1983).
12. See Kurt T. Lash, Power and Subject of Religion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J.
(forthcoming Fall 1998).
13. See Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions, in THE LiFE AND
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 282, 284 (S.B. Forman ed., 1900) ("[N]o
power over the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press
being delegated to the United States by the Constitution, all lawful powers re-
specting the same did of right remain, and were reserved to the states or to the
people."); see also Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, reprinted
in 5 FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 2, at 110 ("The whole power over the
subject of religion is left exclusively to the state governments.").
14. See Lash, supra note 5, at 1088.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
November 1998]
LOYOLA OF LOSANGELES LAWREVIEW
Supreme Court interpreted the Due Process Clause to have "incorpo-
rated" the protections of the First Amendment, so that now neither
state nor federal governments could infringe upon the people's re-
ligious liberty.
16
The problem, of course, was figuring out just which founding
conception of religious liberty had been incorporated: The separa-
tionist vision of Madison and Jefferson, who viewed religion as a di-
visive and potentially dangerous force in public affairs, or the vision
of the so-called non-preferentialists, who agreed that religious exer-
cise should be free, but also believed that government should be free
to foster and promote religious belief?
Since the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment presumably
intended to incorporate some principle of religious liberty, one might
expect that their views would play a major role in determining which
principles they meant to incorporate. In fact, the Court's earliest
opinions ignored the intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment and instead focused on the views of Madison and Jeffer-
son as exemplifying the meaning of the incorporated religion
clauses.' 7 But almost immediately, the separationist views of Madi-
son and Jefferson ran head-on into long- standing historical practices
like school prayer,' 8 equal government support of public and private
education, 19 and legislative accommodation of religion.20  The re-
sulting jurisprudence seemed to point in two directions at once.
From the 1960s until the 1980s, the Supreme Court judged the
constitutionality of government action according to its effect-gener-
ally regardless of the government's intent.
For example, in the 1971 case, Lemon v. Kurtzman,21 the Court
struck down state educational assistance programs that aided
16. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
17. But see Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise
Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U.
L. REV. 1106 (1994); Lash, supra note 5.
18. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963).
19. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
20. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
21. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
[V/ol. 32:1
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religious, as well as secular, private schools. 22 In doing so, the Court
announced the infamous three-part "Lemon test": Government ac-
tions must have a secular purpose; they cannot have a primary effect
of advancing or inhibiting religion; and government regulation must
not excessively entangle church and state.23 The programs in Lemon
were struck down because equal funding of religious institutions cre-
ated the risk that education funds might be used to advance religion,
and efforts to ensure that religion was not advanced would exces-
sively entangle church and state. Thus, even if the educational pro-
gram was not intended to advance religion, if the government aid had
that effect-or threatened to have that effect-such aid violated the
Establishment Clause.
24
The very next year, however, the Court seemed to require under
the Free Exercise Clause what it had forbidden under the Establish-
ment Clause. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,25 a compulsory school atten-
dance law had the effect of interfering with the desire of Amish par-
ents to remove their children from public school after the eighth
grade.26 Applying strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court held that the
state had to exempt the Amish from the law unless the state could
prove that denying the exemption was the least restrictive means of
pursuing a compelling state interest.27 In Yoder, although Wisconsin
did have a compelling interest in educating children, the Court held
that such an interest would be adequately served by the vocational
training the children would receive in the Amish community.28 Ac-
cordingly, the Constitution required that the Amish be exempted
from the otherwise generally applicable attendance law.
When you place Yoder alongside of Lemon you get a vague
sense of vertigo. The Free Exercise Clause seemed to require special
treatment of religiously motivated conduct, but the Establishment
Clause prohibited special-or even equal treatment-when it came
to the disbursement of government benefits. It began to look like the
22. See id. at 606.
23. See id. at 612-13.
24. See id. at 613-14.
25. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
26. See id.
27. Seeid. at214.
28. See id. at 221-22, 224.
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two clauses conflicted with one another and, in fact, the resulting ju-
risprudence was rather tangled and unpredictable. Religious colleges
could receive government funding, religious high schools could not;
religious high schools could receive books, but they could not receive
maps-thus leaving local officials wondering what to do with books
containing maps.29 As then-law professor Antonin Scalia wrote in
1981, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning the Establish-
ment Clause "is in a state of utter chaos and unpredictable change."
30
By the 1990s, however, the Court had moved away from the ef-
fects test, and towards a kind of "equal treatment" analysis under
both religion clauses. For the Free Exercise Clause, the watershed
year was 1990, when the Court handed down its decision in Employ-
ment Division v. Smith.3' In Smith, Galen Black and Alfred Smith
were fired from their jobs as drug counselors after it was discovered
that they had ingested peyote at a ceremony of the Native American
Church.32 They were denied unemployment benefits on the ground
that they had engaged in work-related misconduct.33 The plaintiffs
appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming that application of the un-
employment statute in their case unjustifiably burdened their right to
practice their religious beliefs. The Supreme Court, however, re-
jected their claim and held that neutral and generally applicable laws,
in all but the narrowest of circumstances, do not require strict scru-
tiny under the Free Exercise Clause.34 As long as such laws applied
to everyone, the effect of the law on religious exercise was irrelevant.
A number of scholars and politicians viewed the Court's rea-
soning in Smith as signaling a dramatic change in the Court's protec-
tion of free exercise,35 and, in an effort to reverse the impact of the
29. See George F. Will, The Court and Prayer in Nebraska, WASH. POST,
July 12, 1983, at A17.
30. Antonin Scalia, On Making it Look Easy by Doing It Wrong: A Critical
View of the Justice Department, in PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD:
POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR THE EIGHTIES 173, 173 (Edward M. Gaffney, Jr.
ed., 1981).
31. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
32. See id. at 874.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 881.
35. See Kurt T. Lash, Civilizing Religion, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1100,
1105 (1997) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS:
[Vol. 32:1
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Smith decision, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act.31 RFRA attempted to restore the strict scrutiny test whenever
laws substantially burdened religiously motivated conduct. Last
term, however, the Supreme Court struck down RFRA as exceeding
Congress' power to enforce constitutional rights under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
37
As far as the Establishment Clause is concerned, the shift to-
wards an "equal treatment" analysis has occurred over a series of
cases-but the shift is no less dramatic. Over the past ten years or
so, the Court has upheld a variety of programs that equally aid relig-
ious and secular institutions-most often when the aid is available to
a broad class of beneficiaries or when the religious institution re-
ceives the aid by way of private choice.38 Under this equal treatment
approach, the Court has upheld government aid to religion in the
form of sign language interpreters, vocational education funds, and
printing subsidies for religious publications. Indeed, when it comes
to private religious expression, equal treatment is not only permit-
ted-it is required under the Free Speech Clause.39
In sum, under the Court's current interpretation of the religion
clauses, government may not discriminate on the basis of religion. If
a law has the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, that is a mat-
ter more for the political process than an excuse for judicial inter-
vention.
CONCLUSION
Justice White once wrote that the Court's interpretation of the
Establishment Clause "sacrifice[d] clarity and predictability for
flexibility. 4 ° White further declared that this lack of clarity would
CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES (1997)).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994) [hereinafter "RFRA"].
37. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2170-72 (1997).
38. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997); Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
39. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819 (1995); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753
(1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384 (1993).
40. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646, 662 (1980).
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continue "until the . . . interaction between the courts and the
[s]tate[s] ... produces a single, more encompassing construction of
the Establishment Clause." 41 Today, ladies and gentlemen, we stand
at the threshold of a "single, more encompassing construction" 42 of
the religion clauses: The equal treatment principle. This momentary
doctrinal stability affords us the opportunity to engage in an exercise
of first principles-what ought to be contours of religious liberty un-
der the People's Constitution? Is the emerging principle of "equal
treatment" sufficient to the task of religious liberty in the next mil-
lennium? If not, should we amend our Constitution? Or is the pros-
pect of initiating a new round of judicial interpretation too daunting
to make the game worth the candle?
It is a pleasure to present the thoughts of Professors Kent Gre-
enawalt and Robert George on these fundamental issues of religious
liberty as we enter the next millennium.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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